We present an algebraic theory of structured objects, 1 based on and generalizing Aczel's theory of form systems 2]. Notions of identity of structured objects and of transformations of systems of such objects are discussed. A generalization of Aczel's 2] representation theorem is proven.
Introduction
We develop an algebraic theory of structured objects, artifacts or otherwise, well-founded or not, based on and generalizing Aczel's theory of form systems 2]. Aczel's theory, further developed by Lunnon in her doctoral thesis 9] , has been originally conceived as part of a long term project to provide a mathematical framework for situation theory and it has been in fact set to motion by an unpublished paper 5] of Jon Barwise, proposing a formal sketch of a model for situation theory.
Considerations from situation theory lead to a need to regard the objects of the theory as structured objects, objects within which other objects may occur as their components. The component-of relation, generalizing the membership relation, need not be well-founded, in fact applications of situation theory as in Barwise and Etchemendy 7] would require an antifounded relation, allowing for objects that are components of themselves.
Aczel's theory of form systems formalizes the intuitive idea of a universe of structured objects, well founded (wf) or anti-founded (af), under an operation of replacement of components of an object by other objects.
We generalize Aczel's theory of form systems to the theory of what we have called in 8] pre-form systems and now call them simply systems of objects. What we have found missing in the original theory is (1) a discussion of appropriate concepts of identity of structured objects, (2) a study of adequate notions of transformations of systems of structured objects and (3) some more restraint view on permissible replacement maps. We take up these issues here, exploring natural alternatives to notions of identity of objects that arise by experimenting with objects with the means available, namely by replacement of components by other components. Transformations of systems of objects, we insist, should respect both replacement and components but they should also re ect identity of the abstract behavior of objects under replacement experiments. Discussing these issues leads us to a pleasant algebraic theory of systems of structured objects. We prove existence of free systems and derive from this a representation theorem that generalizes the representation theorem of 2].
As in 2] and unlike the direction taken in 10] we do not seek to provide a theory, rst-order or otherwise, of universes of structured objects. Rather, we aim at modeling our pre-theoretic intuitions about structured objects, their components and change they may undergo due to replacement of components, by describing a formal model, some kind of replacement algebra that adequately, we believe, re ects our basic intuitions.
Systems of Structured Objects
To x a context for discussion let us denote by V the class of all objects of our metatheory. This may include sets, atoms, structured physical objects and whatever the reader's ontological views allow for. For a structured object a, we denote by Ca the set of all objects that appear as components of a. However, in di erent contexts di erent components maps C may be considered. If is a map de ned on the components of a we write :a for the object obtained, intuitively speaking, by simultaneously replacing every component x of a by x. In 2] a liberal view is taken, allowing for arbitrary replacements without imposing any constraint that the object x replacing x as a component of a must be of the \same kind" as x. Thus, if a happens to be a physical object then :a may or may not be physically realizable. Without assuming any preset notion of \sameness" we impose some restrictions on permissible replacements, thus diverging from and generalizing the approach of 2]. To make things more precise, let us suppose some given class X of parts, or components.
De nition 2.1 A system of objects with parts from the class X ( a system over X) is a structure A = (A; C A ; S A ; : A ) where (dropping the subscript A for simplicity) Membership of a replacement map in the set S is thus our notion of a permissible replacement. The form systems over some class X of 2] are exactly the systems of objects over X where S is the collection of all maps : Ca ! X, for a 2 A. An ontology is de ned in 2] as a form system over the class V of all objects. We recall also from 2] that an elementary universe is a form system A = (A; C; :) over the set A. Some simple examples will help x the ideas. Example 2 Let be a signature, that is to say a set of operation symbols with prescribed arities, and let T be the set of all closed -terms. If t = f(t 1 ; : : :; t n ), for some n-ary f 2 , then let Ct = ft 1 ; : : :; t n g. If : Ct ! T is a map, then let :t = f( t 1 ; : : :; t n ). We may let equality of terms be pure syntactic equality or else assume an equational theory and declare s = t just in case` s = t. Depending on what we are interested in, we may allow for all possible replacements or impose restrictions. For example, permissible replacement maps may be taken to be the maps such that for any t 2 dom( ) we have t = t (which is more interesting when we interpret equality as` t = t). In any case :( :t) = :t and the rest of the axioms also trivially hold. 2 Example 3 Let HF be the set of well-founded, hereditarily nite sets, that is sets s that are nite and such that every member of their transitive closure Tc(s) is nite. In the cummulative hierarchy the well-founded hereditarily nite sets are exactly the sets of rank less than !, so that HF = R(! Example 4 For a more mundaine example, let A be the set of all blocks in a Lego toy that can be possibly formed out of a given collection L of basic items of xed shapes and colours. In speaking of possible blocks we do not mean to refer to object-types but rather to concrete particulars di erentiated by the time-interval of their existence. For example suppose we form a block out of four pieces, then take it apart and form an identical block with the same pieces again. At the moment, we count these as two di erent objects. We will discuss the question of identity in a minute. Example 4 is an example of a system of objects which is not a form system, as we have imposed restrictions on the permissible replacement maps. It justi es, we think, our generalizing the theory of form systems to that of systems of objects in the sense of De nition 2.1. Restrictions on replacement can be imposed by introducing an explicit typing of objects and their components, as well as of the replacement maps. An investigation along these lines has been carried out in 9]. The approach we take abstracts away from an awkward explicit typing but maintains the basic idea of not granting to all possible replacement maps the status of a permissible map.
Identity and Transformation
Suppose given a system A. Objects in A change as a result of replacement actions. On the other hand, we should be able to think of the system A itself as being tranformed into some other system as a result of simultaneously transforming all objects in the system. Example 6 Suppose our system consists of all cars of a certain make and model. Replacement of parts by parts of the same make results in another car of the same make and model. Suppose, however, all cars of that make and model turn out to be defective: their ignition system involves a serious risk of re with potentially life-threatening consequences. A new part is manifactured and replacement of the old part with the new is o ered free of charge. Our system of objects has thus been transformed.
To model our intuitions of structured objects we thus need to extend our treatment and provide for transformations of systems. There is a question, however, as to just what a legitimate transformation should be when the subject is approached in the abstract. This relates, we think, to an intricate question: that of the identity of objects through change due to replacement actions. Some systems of ojects have an intrinsic relation of identity. For example, in the system of hereditarily nite sets (Example 3) identity of objects is pure extensional identity of sets. When either intensional objects or physical objects such as artifacts constitute the universe of a system of objects identity is not a straightforward issue. One option is to postulate some relation R of identity on the system and then modify the presentation of a system so as to axiomatize the interaction of identity and replacement. Another option, which is the one we take here, is to classify various notions of identity that naturally arise in the system itself. What we are concerned with can, perhaps, better be described in a pragmatic and experimental language. Given a system of objects we can \experiment" with them with the means that we have available and that is to say by replacing components. What we would like to have is some notion of an abstract behavior of an object through this experimentation. Roughly then, we can construe two objects as being of the same type, identical, if they exhibit the same abstract behavior.
As it turns out there are di erent notions of identity we can formulate. We discuss two natural options below. To simplify the discussion we often avoid explicit mention of what the domain of a replacement map is when this can be unambiguously inferred from the context of the discussion. Two objects a and b are to be deemed abstractly identical just in case every way to change one of them by a permissible replacement of components can be matched by a way to change the other, resulting again in abstractly identical objects. Note that identity of abstract behaviors is thus dependent on the collection S of available replacement experiments. This concept of identity is very broad and it covers a number of particular cases. There is a notion of bisimilarity in the literature on process algebras that our concept of abstract identity is a generalization of. Unfortunately, as process languages cannot be described as systems of objects we cannot make the connection more clear.
Obviously, now, we cannot take (1) as a de nition of because of the circularity involved. However, there is a standard way around this problem.
De nition 2.2 Let A and B be systems of objects (not necessarily over the same class of components). A binary relation R from A to B is a preidentity i for any a 2 A and b 2 B, aRb implies 8 9 :aR :b, and 8 9 :aR :b. Let F be the operator on binary relations R from A to B de ned by F(R) = f(a; b)j8 9 :aR :b and 8 9 :aR :bg Then F is clearly monotone and a relation R is a pre-identity just in case R F(R). Let be the largest xed point of F. Explicitly, = fR A Bj R F(R)g Lemma 2.3 The relation is a (in fact, the largest) pre-identity and it satis es condition (I).
Proof: That is a pre-identity follows from the way we constructed this relation. For condition (I), the direction from left to right is straightforward.
For the converse, let R be the binary relation de ned by aRb i 8 9 :a :b and 8 9 :a :b
It is enough to verify that R is a pre-identity. So assume aRb holds. Given , let be such that :a :b. Then we have that for any 0 there is some 0 such that 0 :( :a) 0 :( :b). Conversely, for any 0 we can nd 0 such that 0 :( :a) 0 :( :b). Thus :aR :b holds by de nition of R. We may then conclude that R is a pre-identity. Hence satis es condition (I). 2
Identity as is a very broad notion and it is probably best to think of it as re ecting structural similarity of objects. Objects that are identi ed by need not even have the same components and this is perhaps too liberal a notion of identity for many examples. Consider Example 3. It should be clear that the relation of equinumerosity of (hereditarily nite) sets satis es condition (I). In a sense, then, it abstracts away too much structure.
We now de ne a more stringent notion of abstract identity, requiring that identity in the new sense implies that the two objects are built on the same set of components (but of course not at the same time, if temporal considerations are relevant to some particular case, like the Lego toy example). For our new notion of identity, denoted by , we would like to have a b i Ca = Cb and 8 :a :b (2) We call this condition (II). As this cannot be taken for a de nition of , we proceed again as we did for the relation .
De nition 2.4 Let A and B be systems of objects. A binary relation from A to B is a congruence i a b implies that Ca = Cb and for all ; :a :b.
If G is the operator on binary relations from A to B such that G(R) = f(a; b)j Ca = Cb and 8 :aR :bg then clearly G is monotone and a relation is a congruence just in case G( ). We then let be the largest xpoint of G. Explicitly,
As for the relation we can verify (by similar argument) the following lemma.
Lemma 2.5 The relation is a (in fact, the largest) congruence from A to B and a re nement of . Furthermore, it satis es condition (II). 2
To get some intuition on what sense of identity is captured by and we return to the Lego toy example (Example 4). There are two intuitive notions of abstract identity we can have. We may say that temporal instances of the \same" object are to be identi ed. We alluded to that when we rst described the example. Given some object constructed from the basic items x; y; z, decompose the object and then recompose \it" again at a di erent time, using exactly the same basic items x; y; z. Regarding objects strictly as particulars as we do, we are forced to see the two instances as distinct objects. This leaves us with the need for a notion of abstract identity that counts the two instances as the same object.
The second intutive notion of identity is that of two objects being copies of each other. We may say that the blocks a and b are copies of each other when they have exactly the same structure and they are composed by basic items that are copies of each other. Basic items are to be considered copies of each other if they have the same shape, but not necessarily the same colour (of course we can change the convention and require sameness of colour as well).
Given the constraints we have imposed on replacement maps it should be clear that the relation formalizes the second intuitive notion of abstract identity, which is probably better described as structural similarity. On the other hand, captures the rst, more stringent notion of identity.
Some Other Options: If the system A = (A; C; S; :) is a universe (a system of objects over A), then it is natural to consider a further notion of identity, in-between and .
De nition 2. We may then let be the union of all partial identities and verify that itself is a partial identity. It is clear that . We can also relativize the de nitions of pre-identity and congruence for arbitrary systems to some given relation r X Y on components. Thus a pre-identity can be de ned as a relation R (A X) (B Y ) such that xRy i xry and then by requiring that aRb satis es conditions similar to these of De nition 2.6. We will not explore these notions further but perhaps they may be useful for potential applications.
Transformations of Systems of Objects
Our concept of a permissible transformation of a system A (over some class X) to a system B (over some class Y ) must re ect what we perceive to be important in the structure of systems of objects. Hence transformations must be well-behaved with respect to components and replacement and they must re ect abstract identity of objects. We do not require that transformations should only be allowed for systems over the same class of components as this seems to be an undue restriction. This complicates the question of specifying what a transformation should be, since we have to provide both a map taking an object a 2 A to some object a 2 B as well as a map that changes components from X to such from Y . There is the option of doing the latter globally, by assuming a map i : X ! Y , or locally by assuming a family of maps i a , one for each object a 2 A, such that i a : C A a ! Y . As the global option is a special case of the pointwise option (take the restriction i a = ij Ca ) we prefer to rst describe the general notion of a transformation. 3 The most signi cant di erence of the two views is that in the global view i is taken to be a function from X to Y while in the local view it is a relation i X Y allowing for the same component to be changed in di erent ways depending on the object it is a component of. The conditions of preservation of components and of replacement should be intuitively clear. The second condition is a technical requirement as we need to make sure that components are changed in a coherent way.
Remark 2. where is once viewed as a map acting on objects and then also as a map changing components i = = ( j a ) a2A . Preservation of components is no problem. But an arbitrary replacement map will fail in general our de nition of a legitimate transformation as we will not be able to nd the unique map i required in the de nition. We may relax requirements as follows. Given an arbitrary object a and a replacement map : Ca ! X, It may be of interest to relax the de nition of a legitimate transformation by making preservation of replacement depend on some compatibility condition. This approach is taken in 4]. We will maintain here the requirement for strict preservation of replacement for two reasons. First, replacement is the backbone of the structures we have called systems of objects. The components map is secondary and it arises only because we regard replacement maps concretely as functions. The abstract structure of a system of objects consists in some monoid-like set S of items we call replacement maps and an action of S to a set A of structured objects S A ! A. If anything is to be preserved then it seems that this should be the action of replacement.
On the other hand, there is no compelling reason why we should want to model our notion of transformation on the behavior of replacement maps when considered as transformations. The functional behavior of replacement maps in the way components are changed is not always desirable as our next example demonstrates.
Example 8 Consider a collection of human individuals, the citizens of an imaginary state, a xed set of tasks to be accomplished and committees formed to undertake these tasks. The structured objects we consider are all the possible committees that can be formed for the given set of tasks.The components map delivers the set of individuals making up a committee. Membership of an individual to a committee changes over time for various reasons. We assume that every citizen is eligible for membership to any committee and thus all replacement maps are permissible. Suppose Charles Smith is in the committees for energy preservation and for the protection of the environment and that he wishes to resign from both. After replacing Mr Smith from these two committees we have a new system of committees. In the global view of transformations of systems of objects Charles Smith should be replaced by the same individual in both committees. This seems to be unduely restrictive, however, hence there is potential usefulness in considering the more general class of transformations we have described in De nition 2.7.
We have gone a good way towards satisfying our requirements as the maps we have described as legitimate transformations are well-behaved with respect to both components and replacement. But we would also like for a legitimate transformation to re ect identity of abstract behavior of objects, in the sense that for any two objects a; a 0 2 A, a = a 0 only if a and a 0 are abstractly identical. This is a minimal criterion by which transformations respect identity of objects. The reason for the failure of re ecting identities is that the second condition in the de nition is too weak. We strengthen it in the following:
De nition 2. Of course in the light of the other conditions on transformations this is equivalent to saying that every replacement map 2 S B de ned on the components of an object of the form a in B is of the form i , for some 2 S A . In other words, in transforming a system of objects abstract identity is re ected provided that in the system f aja 2 Ag no \new" experiments have been added. Every replacement experiment on a is the re ection of some replacement experiment on a. Though When referring to standard transformations we will not make mention of the map i (since i a = id Ca ) and regard it simply as a map : A ! B. Lemma 2.14 Standard transformations re ect -identity of objects. 2 
Representation of Systems of Objects
We develop in this section the algebraic theory of systems of objects, concluded with the Representation Theorem (Theorem 3.12) for systems of objects over some xed class X. We show that every system is isomorphic to a quotient of a restriction of a free ontology. We discuss rst the operations of restriction and quotient. To make use of quotients we establish a Homomorphism Theorem (Theorem 3.4) . We then turn to proving existence of free ontologies and form systems thus leading to our representation theorems.
Restriction: We will have use of two operations of restriction. The simplest one is to restrict to a class X of components, introduced in 2]. This operation will be very useful in the proof of the Representation Theorem The rest is immediate.
2
In the sequel we will feel free to refer to the quotient system A since any two such are isomorphic.
Operations of product and disjoint sum can be de ned in the natural way. In de ning disjoint sum we have to take \copies" of the original systems to make sure that the operation of replacement in the new system is well de ned. We point out the following: We turn now to establishing a Homomorphism Theorem (Theorem 3.4). Next we prove existence of free systems (Theorem 3.6, 3.9) for an appropriate notion of freedom (De nition 3.5). We let Sgn be the category of signatures with standard signature morphisms and Sgn* the category of signatures with the more general notion of map described above. Similarly, we let On be the category of ontologies with standard ontology transformations and On* the category of ontologies with the more general notion of transformation. Finally, de ne^ (!; ) = ĵ : !. Veri cation that (^ ;ĵ) is an ontology transformation is immediate and the equation (^ ;ĵi) = ( ; j) is easily seen to hold. Uniqueness of the ontology transformation (^ ;ĵ) with the prescribed property is also easy to see.
Ontologies

2
By uniqueness of free objects, up to isomorphism, when they exist we can conclude that Corollary 3.7 The free ontologies over a signature ( ; ) are exactly the ontologies isomorphic to the signature ontology U .
Theorem 3.8 (Ontology Representation) For every ontology U there is a signature ( ; ) and a congruence on the signature ontology U such that there is a standard isomorphism U = U ; . Proof: U ; is the quotient of the signature ontology U when factored out by the congruence . For the proof, given an ontology U = (U; C; :) let ( ; ) be the signature jUj = (U; C) and U the signature ontology. Since the identity is a morphism ( ; ) ! jUj and U is free over ( ; ) there must be a (unique) morphism (^ ;ĵ) : U ! U. It is easy to see that this morphism is surjective. Let then = ker(^ ). By the Homomorphism Theorem (Theorem 3.4) it follows that U ; = U. It is also clear that (^ ;ĵ) is a standard morphism since both the identity ( ; ) ! jUj and the morphism ( ; i) : ( ; ) ! jU j are standard. 2 
Form Systems
We dealt with ontologies rst because this case is quite simple. In this section we turn to considering form systems over some xed class X. Again, depending on what transformations we consider we distinguish between the categories X-Fs, with standard transformations, and X-Fs*, with the general notion of transformation. To prove existence of free form systems and representation we restrict the class of signatures to the X-bounded signatures, that is to say signatures ( ; ) such that for each ! 2 , ! can be injected into X. If A = (A; C; :) is a form system over X, then its underlying signature jAj = (A; C) is obviously X-bounded. The 
General Systems of Objects
We will prove here directly a representation theorem without detouring through a proof of existence of free systems. We can de ne a suitable notion of an S-bounded signature, for a partial monoid S, as a signature ( ; ) such that for every ! 2 the trivial replacement map = id ! 2 S. We can then proceed, in principle at least, as we did for the case of ontologies and form systems and derive a result on free systems of objects over a given S-bounded signature. The interested reader might want to carry out the details. Here we constrain ourselves to the following:
Theorem 3.12 (Representation of Systems of Objects) For every system A = (A; C; S; :), there is a (in fact, an S-bounded) signature ( ; ) and a congruence on the restriction U jS such that there is a standard isomorphism A = (U jS) . Proof: Given A, let jAj = ( ; ) be its underlying signature (A; C) and consider the restriction U jS of the signature ontology U . The universe of objects in U jS consists of pairs (a; ), a 2 A = and dom( ) = a = Ca. Let : U jS ! A be the map (a; ) = :a. Then is a standard morphism.
Satisfaction of the requirement for components of De nition 2.7 is obviously satis ed since C 0 (a; ) = rng( ) = f xjx 2 a = Cag Given 2 S with dom( ) = rng( ), ( :(a; )) = (a; ) = :( :a). Hence a map i = exists such that the replacement requirement of De nition 2.7 is satis ed. In fact is the unique such map since if were another one it should satisfy i :a = i a . Given that is a standard map, the components maps i a are identities and thereby = .
Now clearly is surjective, since for each a 2 A the pair (a; id Ca ) is in the universe U S] of the system U jS. Let then = ker( ). By the Homomorphism Theorem 3.4 it follows that is a standard isomorphism : A = (U jS) .
Summary
We have developed a model for our pre-theoretic intuitions of structured objects subject to change under permissible replacement of components. Our notion of a system of objects generalizes that of a form system presented in 2]. We approached the question of identity of objects through change describing the question in an experimental-like language. The general idea is that objects are to be classi ed as of the same type (abstractly identical) if they exhibit the same abstract behavior under replacement experiments. We distinguished some notions of identity, ; and , where is a re nement of and a re nement of . Systems of objects are, themselves, entities subject to change. We introduced a broad notion of permissible transformations that respect both components and replacement experiments. We also investigated further restrictions on transformations that will guarantee that abstract identity of objects is re ected. Systems of objects can be regarded as replacement algebras. It is then natural to raise some purely algebraic questions, such as the question of representation, also raised in 2]. For ontologies and form systems we obtained our representation results by essentially algebraic means, proving rst existence of free systems and a homomorphism theorem. A representation theorem for form systems was rst given in 2]. Our proof is di erent (and much shorter!). We also generalized the result here to a representation for arbitrary systems of objects. An essentially algebraic development for ontologies was also started in an Appendix in 2]. Ontologies are there regarded as some kind of many-sorted algebras. We have taken a much simpler approach here that, nevertheless, allows us to recapture and strengthen results of 2].
